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Proposed Tax Return Preparer
Penalty Regulations:
A Comparison with Existing Guidance
by Mitchell M. Gans, Hempstead,New York,
Jonathan G. Blattmachr, New York, New York, and
Elisabeth 0. Madden, New York, New York*
Editors' Synopsis: This article considers newly
issued proposed regulations under section 6694 of the
Internal Revenue Code, which imposes tax return preparerpenalties. The articlediscusses new rules and differences from existing authority concerning such matters as multiple preparers of a return and non-income
tax returns. The article also points out uncertainties
which could be addressedin the final regulations.
In May 2007, Congress amended section 6694 of
the Code,' strengthening the preparer penalties it
imposes in three ways.
First, it expanded the section so that it now applies
to preparers of non-income-tax returns.
Second, it heightened the standards that preparers
must satisfy in order to avoid the penalty. As a general
rule, as amended, the section requires that a preparer
reasonably conclude, in good faith, that it is more likely
than not that the position will be sustained on the merits.
Prior to the amendment, the preparer was only required
to conclude that the position had a realistic possibility
of succeeding.

Copyright 2008 by the authors. All rights reserved.
This article shall make frequent references to section 6694
of the Code. In all cases, this shall be deemed to refer to section
6694 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 as amended.
I The proposed regulations define the term "reasonable
basis" by cross-referencing the definition in Treas. Reg. § 1.66623. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(c)(1). And, according to the
I.R.S., the term "reasonable basis", when used in Treas. Reg. §
1.6662-3, requires a ten percent probability of success. See I.R.S.
FACT SHEET No. 2008-19, AVOIDING PENALTIES AND THE TAX GAP
(March 2008). Interestingly, the I.R.S. contemplates that this test
can only be satisfied if there is "some authority supporting the
position." See id. This should be contrasted with Example 1 in
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(b)(4), which will be discussed in text,
where the conclusion is reached that the more-likely-than-not standard can be satisfied on the basis of a well-reasoned construction of
the statute, even if there is no other supporting authority.
2008-3 IRB 282, Doc 2007-28351, 2008 TNT 1-6.
For background about the section and Notice 2008-13, see
Jonathan G. Blattmachr et al., Circular230 and PreparerPenalties: Evil Siblings for Practitioners,TAX NOTEs, Apr. 28, 2008;
*

Under the section, as amended, as well as prior to the
amendment, an exception is made where the position is
disclosed. Under the amendment, there must be a reasonable basis for the position-apparently, a 10% probability of success--in order for the exception to be available. Prior to the amendment, the exception could be
invoked as long as the position was not a frivolous one.
Third, the amendment increases the amount of the
penalty.
In January 2008, the Internal Revenue Service
("Service") issued Notice 2008-13,' which provides
interim guidance concerning the amendment.' As the
Notice indicates, it will remain effective until further
guidance is issued. On June 17, 2008, the Treasury
Department, along with the Service, issued proposed
regulations that, once finalized, will replace existing regulations and the Notice. Until they are made final, however, the guidance in the Notice will remain in effect.'
While the proposed regulations follow the general
pattern established in the Notice, they would make
some important changes. This article considers the
most important of these changes.

Mitchell M. Gans & Jonathan G. Blattmachr, Notice 2008-13
Offers Interim Guidance on Tax Return PreparationandAdvice, 22
DAILY TAX REP., Feb. 4, 2008.

1 The Notice provides that, until the regulations are revised,
it will remain effective. In the proposed regulations, the preamble
indicates that it will not become effective until the regulations are
made final and, in no event, prior to December 31, 2008. Note that
the proposed regulations do not invite reliance. Thus, until they
become final, they are not binding and, indeed, have no precedential value. See, e.g., Boeing v. U.S., 537 U.S. 437, 453 n.13
(2003); Square D Co. v. Comm'r, 121 T.C. 168, 205 (2003); Garvey v. U.S., 726 F.2d 1569, 1571-72 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Yocum v.
U.S., 66 Fed.C1. 579 (Cl. Ct. 2005). But see Elkins v. Comm'r, 81
T.C. 669 (1983) (finding an abuse of discretion where the final regulations changed the meaning of the term used in the proposed regulations and the taxpayer had relied on the proposed regulations).
Nevertheless, in some cases, the Internal Revenue Service has,
when final regulations have been adopted, stated that taxpayers
could rely on any reasonable interpretation of the proposed regulations before the final regulations became effective. See, e.g., T.D.
8395, 1992-16 I.R.B. 5.

34

ACTEC Journal 77

(2008)

In the most important of these changes, the proposed regulations adopt the AICPA recommendation
that a single return can have multiple preparers within
the same firm. Under existing regulations,6 one person
in the firm is responsible for all of the positions taken
on the return.' In contrast, under the proposed regulations, each preparer giving advice about the return can
be responsible for the section 6694 penalty for the
position about which he or she gave advice.! In other
words, the signing preparer and a non-signing adviser
in the same firm are both potentially subject to the preparer penalty. For example, assume A signs the return
but relies on a schedule prepared by co-employee B,

who is primarily responsible for the schedule-related
position. Only B would be responsible for the position
in terms of the penalty if it results in an understatement
of tax. A, as the signing preparer, would remain
responsible for the other positions taken on the return.
The same approach does not, however, apply where
more than one firm is involved. If, in this example, A
and B were employed by different firms, they could
both be treated as responsible preparers with respect to
the position about which B gave advice: A, as the signer, and B, as a non-signing adviser, if the advice given
by B constitutes the preparation of a substantial portion
of the return.' Thus, both could be subject to penalty in
connection with the same position. Nonetheless, A
would be permitted to defend against the imposition of
the penalty by establishing reliance on B's advice 0 an
expanded concept under the proposed regulations."

See Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-1(b)(1).
Under existing regulations, as a corollary to the rule that
there can only be one preparer within a firm, a preparer may not
avoid responsibility for the penalty by establishing reliance on
another preparer or adviser within the same firm. See Treas. Reg. §
1.6694-2(d)(5). The Notice implicitly began to deviate from this
approach. In Example 6 of the Notice, a signing preparer relied on
a schedule prepared by another person in the same firm. The
schedule did not appear to be incorrect or incomplete. Indicating
that the signing preparer was not required to audit or verify independently the information contained in the schedule, the Example
concludes that the signing preparer would not be subject to penalty.
Thus, the Notice tacitly contemplated what the proposed regulations make explicit: that each preparer within a firm should be
responsible for the position about which he or she gave advice.
8 See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-1(b).
The proposed regulations are not entirely clear as to
whether the non-signing adviser who is within the same firm as the
signing preparer should be viewed as a preparer if the advice could
not have a substantial impact on the taxpayer's liability. Prop.
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-15(b)(2) defines a non-signing preparer as
one who "who prepares all or a substantial portion of a return."
This would suggest that if a person gives advice about an insubstantial portion of the return, he or she would not be deemed a preparer. However, Prop. Treas. Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-1(b), in establishing the concept that there may be multiple preparers within the
same firm, appears to contemplate that a person giving advice to a
co-employee who signs the return is a preparer without regard to
the substantiality of the position. Even though Prop. Treas. Reg. §
1.6694-1(b) cross-references the definition of return preparer in
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-15, it would seem that an adviser giving advice to a co-employee should be treated as a preparer without
regard to the substantial-portion rule. For, under Prop. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.6694-1(b), the signing preparer is not responsible for the penalty in these circumstances. As a policy matter, it does not seem
appropriate to treat all positions not constituting a substantial portion of the return as immune from the preparer penalty simply
because the signer received advice from a co-employee. On the
other hand, if the position is insubstantial, the prospect of such
immunity is not terribly alarming. Indeed, it is arguable that even
the signing preparer should not be liable for the penalty if the error

is insubstantial. But note that, in Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2, the
materiality of the error is only one factor to consider in determining
if there was reasonable cause and good faith, thus implying an
intent to enforce the penalty in some cases even though it does not
have a significant impact on the taxpayer's liability.
"oSee Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-1(e).
" Unlike the Notice, the proposed regulations provide that a
preparer may rely on a prior return prepared by someone else. See
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-1 (e)(2). For example, when preparing
an estate tax return, the preparer may rely on prior gift tax returns
in computing the amount of adjusted taxable gifts without independently verifying the accuracy of those returns after confirming that
there was no adjustment through audit or otherwise. See id.
However, the preparer may not ignore the implications of information furnished to the preparer or actually known by the preparer.
And if the furnished information appears to be incorrect or incomplete, the preparer must make further inquiry. See id.
The Notice indicates that Treas. Reg. 1.6694-1(e) will continue to govern the kind of taxpayer-supplied information that preparers may utilize in preparing the return. In the example contained in this regulation, the conclusion is reached that a preparer
may, in general, rely on the information supplied by the taxpayer
without examining the underlying documentation. Surprisingly,
the proposed regulations fail to carry over this example. While the
preamble does not reveal any intent to change the current approach,
the only relevant example in the proposed regulations (Example 1
in Prop. Reg. 1.6694-1 (e)(3)) deals with a case where the preparer
not only failed to inquire about the existence of a supporting
appraisal but also failed to comply with a requirement in the Code
that a valuation-related form be attached to the return. This example's failure to indicate that, absent the special requirement in the
Code, the preparer would not have had a duty to examine the supporting documentation-along with the failure to carry over the
example from the existing regulations-creates some uncertainty.
It would be helpful if the final regulations carried over the existing
example. This would confirm that the preparer may accept the
client's representations without having to examine the underlying
documents. It would, moreover, confirm the notion in the current
example that where the Code or a regulation requires the taxpayer
to maintain or possess a particular document, the preparer need
only ask if the taxpayer has satisfied the requirement.

DIFFERENT PREPARERS CAN BE
RESPONSIBLE FOR DIFFERENT POSITIONS
ON THE RETURN

6
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While in theory both A and B would be viewed as preparers, only B would be subject to the penalty as a
practical matter if A could establish the necessary elements of reliance.12 In short, the net effect of treating
both as preparers while allowing A to defeat the
penalty by showing reliance on B is to force A to
establish the elements of reliance-whereas A would
not have to make such a showing were they part of the
same firm.
Surprisingly, the proposed regulations appear to
contemplate the possibility that no preparer-neither
the signer nor any adviser-would be responsible for
the penalty in connection with certain positions. To
illustrate, assume that A, the signer, and B, a non-signing adviser, are employed by different firms. In this
two-firm context, a non-signing adviser can only be
responsible for the penalty if he or she knew or had to
reason to know of the position and it constitutes a substantial part of the return. If, in this example, the position does not constitute a substantial part of the return,
B could not be responsible for the penalty. At the
same time, A could avoid the penalty by showing
reliance on B's advice.
While the proposed regulations only tacitly
endorse this no-penalty position in the context of
these posited facts, they do explicitly accept this outcome in another context. In Prop. Treas. Reg. §
1.6694-1(f), Example 3, the signing preparer relied on
advice given by a co-employee. Because the coemployee gave the advice before the transaction was
consummated and because a person giving such pretransaction advice is not viewed as a return preparer
and is therefore not subject to the penalty, no penalty
could be imposed on the co-employee. Nor, the
Example concludes, would the signing preparer be
subject to penalty in connection with this position
assuming reliance on the co-employee is established.
Thus, as suggested, this Example explicitly accepts
the notion that there are contexts in which no preparer
can be penalized for the position.

DIFFERENT TREATMENT FOR PREPARERS
OF NON-INCOME-TAX RETURNS

" The proposed regulations fail to consider whether a signing
preparer can rely on a non-signing adviser where the advice is not
unequivocal. For example, if a non-signing adviser gives the signing preparer an opinion that there is a reasonable basis for taking
the position-complying with Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.66942(c)(3)(ii)(B) by indicating to the signer that disclosure may be
required-can the signer avoid the penalty by claiming reliance on
the advice?
" Under the Notice, whether the client filed the return with
the disclosure attached or instead deleted it apparently is not relevant for preparer-penalty purposes.
" Under the Notice, as well as the proposed regulations, a
preparer may be able to avoid penalty in certain contexts even
though the more-likely-than-not standard is not satisfied by giving

the client advice about taxpayer penalties (provided there is a reasonable basis for the position). Compare Prop. Treas. Reg. 1.66942(c)(3) with section G of the Notice (both permitting the preparer
to avoid the penalty by giving penalty advice but requiring, in certain contexts, different kinds of advice). If a preparer penalty is
assessed or proposed, it would seem that the preparer would be
permitted to defend by establishing that the penalty advice had
been given. The fact that the advice was subject to privilege
should not prevent the preparer from making this defense. See,
e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 83
(2000)(permitting a lawyer to disclose privileged information in
order to defend against a charge of wrongdoing in the course of the
representation).
" See, e.g., Melnik v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 2006-25.

In another important change from the Notice, the
proposed regulations create a new exception for nonincome-tax returns, under which the preparer may
qualify for the reasonable basis standard even though
there is no substantial authority and no disclosure
form attached to the return. Under the Notice, absent
substantial authority in a case not involving a tax shelter, the preparer had only one choice: attach the necessary disclosure to the return.13 Giving the client advice
about the potential for taxpayer penalties under section 6662 was not sufficient. The penalty-disclosure
approach only protected the preparer from penalty if
there was substantial authority for the position. 4 As a
result, while the Notice was designed to ameliorate
conflicts between preparer and client, it caused a misalignment of interests in this context.
To illustrate, assume that, in preparing an estate tax
return, the preparer determined that a position was supported by a reasonable basis but lacked substantial
authority. If the preparer advised the client of his or her
conclusions, taxpayer penalties under section 6662
could not apply. This is because a reasonable-basis
opinion should enable a taxpayer to defeat the negligence penalty." Thus, the taxpayer would have no
incentive to make disclosure on the return. After all,
unlike an income tax return, where the substantialunderstatement penalty can be avoided by making disclosure, this penalty is not imposed in the estate tax context and there would be, therefore, no value to the taxpayer in making the disclosure. Indeed, a client might
well prefer not to make disclosure in order to reduce the
risk of audit. But under the Notice, the preparer would
be subject to the section 6694 penalty in these circumstances if the disclosure were not attached to the return
(as delivered to the client). Hence, a conflict under the
Notice would arise: it would be in the preparer's interest
to attach the disclosure form to the return in order to
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avoid having to comply with the "more likely than not"
standard and instead use the lower, reasonable basis,
standard-with the preparer, perhaps, advising the taxpayer about the opportunity for the taxpayer to remove
the disclosure form before filing the return-but it might
well be in the client's interest not to make the disclosure.
Reflecting a concern about this conflict, the proposed regulations create an exception for non-income
tax returns. They permit the preparer of such a return
to qualify for the lower standard if certain advice about
taxpayer penalties is given. In creating this exception,
they eliminate the conflict by realigning the client and
the preparer's interests: the failure to attach the disclosure to the return adversely affects neither one of them.
Although this discrimination between preparers of
income and non-income tax returns is clearly contrary
to the statute-which sets the same standards for preparers of all returns-it is a welcome change given the
preparer-client conflicts that would otherwise occur.
Note, however, that although the proposed regulations take this preparer-friendly approach, they also
make unavailable an exception that preparers of
income tax returns can continue to enjoy. Whereas the
preparer of an income tax return can avoid penalties if
there is a reasonable basis for the position by attaching
the disclosure form to the return, even if the taxpayer
removes it before filing the return, the preparer of a
non-income tax return can only qualify for this lower
standard through disclosure if, in fact, the return is
filed with the disclosure attached. While, at first
blush, it might seem that this creates a significant disadvantage for the non-income tax return preparer, it
does not. As indicated, unlike the preparer of an
income tax return, the preparer of a non-income tax
return can qualify for the reasonable-basis standard
simply by giving the taxpayer penalty advice.
TAX SHELTERS
Another change that the proposed regulations make
involves tax shelters. Under the Notice, in the case of a
tax shelter, the preparer need only give the client advice
about taxpayer penalties in order to avoid preparer penalties."6 Under the proposed regulations, in contrast, absent
6 The Notice requires advice about the penalty standards
applicable to the taxpayer and the difference, if any, between these
standards and the standards applicable to the preparer under section 6694.
" This section imposes a penalty on the substantial understatement of income tax.
" This section imposes a penalty on reportable and listed
transactions.
*' Under current regulations, heightened standards are
imposed on corporate taxpayers investing in tax shelters. See
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disclosure, preparer penalties can only be avoided in the
case of a tax shelter via the reasonable basis standard if
the preparer advises the client: (1) that, at a minimum,
there must be substantial authority supporting the position in order to avoid taxpayer penalties; (2) that the
client must reasonably believe that the position taken on
the return is more likely than not correct in order to avoid
the taxpayer penalties under sections 6662(d)" and
6662A 8 ; and (3) that disclosure of the position on the
return is not sufficient to defeat taxpayer penalties. It is
somewhat surprising that the proposed regulations
impose these additional requirements. After all, there are
no regulations currently in place under either section
6662 or section 6662A that require a taxpayer using a tax
shelter to meet such stringent requirements in order to
avoid penalties. Thus, unless such regulations are adopted, the proposed regulations require a preparer to give
penalty advice to the client that may not be accurate."
PENALTY ADVICE: NO BOILERPLATE
In terms of the method by which penalty advice is
to be given to clients, the proposed regulations take aim
at recommendations made in the wake of the Notice's
issuance. Some (including the authors of this article)
had suggested that the advice the Notice required could
be included in the engagement letter, thus preventing
the preparer from inadvertently failing to comply with
the penalty-advice requirements in the Notice during
the engagement.20 The proposed regulations, however,
provide that a general disclaimer of this type is not sufficient.2' Nonetheless, they do permit the preparer to
include the penalty advice relating to all of the positions in question in one document or to instead treat
each such position in a separate document.22 The nogeneral-disclaimer rule is presumably driven by a concern that the penalty advice might not be given serious
consideration by the client unless it is provided in the
context of a discussion of the particular position.
CRITICAL EXAMPLES REVISITED
The proposed regulations eliminate a controversial
example contained in the Notice. In Example 10, the
Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(f). No similar regulation applies in the case
of an individual. And while penalties imposed on individuals
under section 6662A do trigger heightened standards, see section
6664(d), this section does not appear to apply to all tax shelters but
only arrangements that are deemed to constitute a reportable or
listed transaction.
' See Blattmachr et al., Circular 230 and PreparerPenalties,
supra note 4.
1 See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(c)(3)(iii)
" See id.

signing preparer researches an issue and concludes that
there is a reasonable basis for the position to be taken.
The preparer cannot, however, reach a more-likelythan-not conclusion "because it was impossible to
make a precise quantification regarding whether the
position would more likely than not be sustained on the
merits." Nonetheless, the Example concludes, the preparer is not subject to penalty even if no disclosure is
made and the preparer gives no penalty advice to the
taxpayer. It is difficult to square this Example with the
statute. After all, the statute requires disclosure if the
more-likely-than-not standard is not satisfied, making
no exception for difficult cases involving a close call.
Yet, one can easily understand the Internal Revenue
Service's willingness to provide relief for a preparer
who, in good faith, carefully considers the issue and is
simply unable to reach the rather artificial more-likelythan-not conclusion.
Although, as indicated, the proposed regulations
do not carry over this Example, they do continue to
reflect sympathy for the plight of such a preparer.
They give preparers who are required to make a close
call two grounds upon which to defend against the
penalty. First, in setting forth the more-likely-thannot standard, they make the following factors relevant:
the preparer's level of experience; the preparer's diligence in reaching the conclusion; the complexity of
the issue; and the preparer's familiarity with the area
of tax law that is implicated and taxpayer's affairs.23
Second, in fleshing out the reasonable cause and good
faith defense contained in the statute, they explicitly
provide that the complexity and/or technical nature of
the issue are to be considered.24 They go on to provide
that there may be justification for invoking the defense
if the complex or technical nature of the issue is such
that a competent preparer would have made the same
error.25 (The defense is based on a variety of enumerated factors, with no single factor given determinative
weight.) Thus, even though Example 10 is not part of
the proposed regulations, the principles underlying the
example have not been entirely disavowed.

The proposed regulations also address a problematic implication in another example in the Notice. In
Example 3, an attorney gives tax advice regarding a
proposed transaction. After it is consummated, the
attorney gives no additional advice concerning the tax
treatment of the transaction. Consistent with the provision in existing regulations,26 the Example concludes
that such pre-transaction advice does not render the
attorney subject to preparer penalties. The difficulty, of
course, is the implication that if the attorney had a short
post-transaction conversation with the taxpayer or the
person preparing the return about the treatment of the
transaction on the return, he or she would be deemed a
preparer for purposes of the penalty. The proposed regulations provide a salutary remedy.27 As long as the
time incurred in giving the post-transaction advice is
less than five percent of the total time incurred with
respect to the position, such post-transaction advice
does not constitute activity that is subject to the penalty.
As a practical matter, this will make it important for
preparers to keep accurate time records. Unfortunately,
however, there is-at least at this time-no similar pretransaction exception in Circular 230 (which contains
the ethical rules applicable to attorneys and CPAs who
practice before the Service). 28

23 See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(b). Surprisingly, the proposed regulations fail to utilize the same factors for purposes of
determining whether the reasonable basis standard has been satisfied. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(c)(2). Perhaps, this was an
inadvertent omission.
24 See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(d).
' See id.
26 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-15(a).
27 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-15(b)(2).
2 Section 10.34 of the Circular, which imposes standards similar to those contained in section 6694 of the Code, fails to provide a
pre-transaction-advice exception. Thus, while practitioners may be

immune from penalties under the Code for such advice, they may
nonetheless remain subject to sanction under the Circular.
I See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(b)(4). No such guidance
is given in the portion of the proposed regulations dealing with the
reasonable basis standard, see Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(c),
other than to cross reference Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(3).
" The fourth example, not considered in text, is straightforward. In the example (Example 2), the Code is amended to unambiguously deny the treatment sought by the taxpayer. The preparer
concludes that the new provision is inequitable as applied to the
taxpayer. The Example concludes that the preparer could not satisfy the more-likely-than-not standard.

THE WEIGHT OF AUTHORITY AND THE
MORE-LIKELY-THAN-NOT STANDARD
Unlike the Notice, the proposed regulations
explore how the more-likely-than-not standard is to
be applied in the context of different kinds of authorities.29 Of the four examples contained in the proposed regulations, three are of particular interest.30
First, Example 1 (Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(b)(4))
indicates that the preparer's well-reasoned construction of a newly enacted Code section can satisfy the
standard. Thus, even if there is no existing authority
to support the argument, it may be possible to reach a
more-likely-than-not conclusion based on a reading
of the statute alone.
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Second, Example 3 (same regulation) considers a
case where the preparer, in filing the 2007 return,
finds three private letter rulings, issued in 2002 and
2003, which support the taxpayer's position. However, after these rulings had been issued, temporary regulations were promulgated that took a contrary position. The Example concludes that the preparer may
not rely on the private letter rulings in making the
more-likely-than-not assessment. The interesting
implication, of course, is that had the temporary regulations not been issued, the three rulings might well
have constituted sufficient authority to satisfy the
standard (and would presumably satisfy the reasonable basis standard as well)."
Third, in Example 4 (same regulation), there are
five circuit court cases relevant to the issue in circuits other than where the client resides, three of
which were won by the taxpayer. The preparer
determines that the client's factual position is more
similar to these three cases than to the other two won
by the government. The Example concludes that the
more-likely-than-not standard is satisfied. Unfortunately, the Example raises more questions than it
answers. For example, if all five decisions had been
based on identical facts, would the preparer be precluded from reaching a more-likely-than-not conclusion? And what if there is only one taxpayer-friendly circuit court decision? Can such a single authority serve as a predicate for a more-likely-than-not
conclusion? What if there is authority in the circuit
where the taxpayer resides?32 And, finally, could
such home-circuit authority enable a preparer to
reach a more-likely-than-not conclusion if other circuits had taken a contrary view? Perhaps, some, or
all, of these questions will receive attention in the
final regulations.

CONCLUSION: AVOIDING PREPARER
PENALTIES

The proposed regulation does cross-reference Treas. Reg. §
1.6662-4, which does explicitly provide that private letter rulings
may be considered in determining whether the substantial-authority standard has been satisfied.
32 Note that, in Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4, the presence of homecircuit authority can prove to be critical for purposes of determining whether there is substantial authority for the taxpayer's position: a favorable decision in the home circuit constitutes substantial
authority, while unfavorable authority in other circuits does not
preclude the taxpayer from making a substantial-authority showing. While the proposed regulations cross-reference Treas. Reg. §
1.6662-4, they do not make any reference to the portion of the reg-

ulation that deals with home-circuit authority.
11Section 10.34 of the Circular will, once pending amendments are finalized, mirror the two-tier approach in section 6694,
requiring the preparer to reach either a reasonable-basis conclusion
if disclosure is made or a more-likely-than-not conclusion if it is
not. Interestingly, however, section 10.34 is not perfectly congruent with the proposed regulations. Most significant, unlike the
proposed section 6694 regulations, it does not, at least under the
pending amendment, permit the preparer to qualify for the lower
standard by giving the client penalty advice. Perhaps, they will be
made congruent once the section 6694 regulations are finalized.
I See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(d).
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Preparers must take seriously an important theme in
the proposed regulations: that willful violations or a pattern of errors will be treated more harshly than isolated or
innocent mistakes. The proposed regulations reflect this
theme at three different junctures. First, in discussing the
potential overlap between section 6694 and Circular
230,11 the preamble indicates that a violation of section
6694 will not automatically lead to a referral to the Office
of Professional Responsibility. In the absence of a pattern or willful behavior, in other words, a referral-and
the potential threat of disbarment from practice before
the Internal Revenue Service that such a referral posesis inappropriate. Second, in explicating how the morelikely-than-not standard will be enforced, the proposed
regulations focus on, among other things, the level of the
preparer's experience, the preparer's familiarity with the
client's affairs and whether the provision at issue is of a
complex or technical nature. Third, the factors that must
be considered under the proposed regulations where a
preparer invokes the reasonable-cause-and-good-faith
defense similarly reflect this theme: frequency of errors;
the materiality of the errors; reliance on the advice of others; the technical or complex nature of the Code provision; and the firm's review practices.' As this list of factors reveals-particularly the last factor mentioned-preparers who implement appropriate review practices and
who diligently attempt to comply with the requirements
of section 6694 will find that the likelihood of penaltyor referral to the Office of Professional Responsibilitygreatly reduced. In short, more than anything else, the
proposed regulations make clear the need for preparers to
start instituting and enforcing policies that will enable
them to demonstrate good faith when errors do occur.

